From 4cbf9d8d2c9fc3cae387c20d9d7f7c1fb622ee2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Peng Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 17:14:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] opensc: fix CVE-2023-5992 CVE-2023-5992: A vulnerability was found in OpenSC where PKCS#1 encryption padding removal is not implemented as side-channel resistant. This issue may result in the potential leak of private data. Reference: [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5992] [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/wiki/CVE-2023-5992] Upstream patches: [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016] Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari --- .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch | 359 ++++++++++++++++++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch | 269 +++++++++++++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch | 41 ++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch | 109 ++++++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch | 63 +++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch | 118 ++++++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch | 50 +++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch | 37 ++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch | 123 ++++++ .../opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch | 75 ++++ .../recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.22.0.bb | 10 + 11 files changed, 1254 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4798ab56ae --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +From 9c14d6d996e526ebfda75de7b577255acf7ad86d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 13:54:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Reimplement removing of PKCS#1 v1.5 padding to be time + constant + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/common/Makefile.am | 5 +- + src/common/constant-time.h | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/libopensc/internal.h | 4 +- + src/libopensc/padding.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++--------- + src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c | 5 +- + src/minidriver/minidriver.c | 4 +- + 6 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 src/common/constant-time.h + +diff --git a/src/common/Makefile.am b/src/common/Makefile.am +index 83a40e1c2..c4cfff185 100644 +--- a/src/common/Makefile.am ++++ b/src/common/Makefile.am +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ dist_noinst_DATA = \ + LICENSE.compat_getopt compat_getopt.txt \ + compat_getopt_main.c \ + README.compat_strlcpy compat_strlcpy.3 +-noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h ++noinst_HEADERS = compat_strlcat.h compat_strlcpy.h compat_strnlen.h compat_getpass.h compat_getopt.h simclist.h libpkcs11.h libscdl.h constant-time.h + + AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/src + +@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ TIDY_FILES = \ + compat_report_rangecheckfailure.c \ + compat___iob_func.c \ + simclist.c simclist.h \ +- libpkcs11.c libscdl.c ++ libpkcs11.c libscdl.c \ ++ constant-time.h + + check-local: + if [ -x "$(CLANGTIDY)" ]; then clang-tidy -config='' --checks='$(TIDY_CHECKS)' -header-filter=.* $(addprefix $(srcdir)/,$(TIDY_FILES)) -- $(TIDY_FLAGS); fi +diff --git a/src/common/constant-time.h b/src/common/constant-time.h +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..40c3e500c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/common/constant-time.h +@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ ++/* Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/include/internal/constant_time.h */ ++ ++#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_H ++#define CONSTANT_TIME_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#if !defined(inline) ++#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L ++#define constant_inline inline ++#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 ++#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 ++#elif defined(_MSC_VER) ++#define constant_inline __inline ++#else ++#define constant_inline ++#endif ++#else /* use what caller wants as inline may be from config.h */ ++#define constant_inline inline /* inline */ ++#endif ++ ++/*- ++ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true ++ * and 0 for false. For example, ++ * if (a < b) { ++ * c = a; ++ * } else { ++ * c = b; ++ * } ++ * can be written as ++ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b); ++ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b); ++ */ ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++value_barrier(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ volatile unsigned int r = a; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++value_barrier_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ volatile size_t r = a; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++/* MSB */ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_msb_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_msb(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); ++} ++ ++/* Select */ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return (value_barrier(mask) & a) | (value_barrier(~mask) & b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned char ++constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) ++{ ++ return (unsigned char)constant_time_select(mask, a, b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_select_s(size_t mask, size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return (value_barrier_s(mask) & a) | (value_barrier_s(~mask) & b); ++} ++ ++/* Zero */ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1)); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_is_zero_s(size_t a) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb_s(~a & (a - 1)); ++} ++ ++/* Comparison*/ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_lt_s(size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb_s(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return ~constant_time_lt(a, b); ++} ++ ++/* Equality*/ ++ ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b); ++} ++ ++static constant_inline size_t ++constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b); ++} ++ ++#endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */ +diff --git a/src/libopensc/internal.h b/src/libopensc/internal.h +index e7ac63ccf..57568d311 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/internal.h ++++ b/src/libopensc/internal.h +@@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ int _sc_card_add_xeddsa_alg(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int key_length, + + int sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, + u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); +-int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, +- u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); ++int sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, ++ unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len); + int sc_pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(unsigned int *algorithm, + const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_len, u8 *out_dat, size_t *out_len); + +diff --git a/src/libopensc/padding.c b/src/libopensc/padding.c +index e4940ea2b..3a8b81c3f 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/padding.c ++++ b/src/libopensc/padding.c +@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "internal.h" + + /* TODO doxygen comments */ + ++#define SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE 11 ++ + /* + * Prefixes for pkcs-v1 signatures + */ +@@ -143,45 +146,82 @@ sc_pkcs1_strip_01_padding(struct sc_context *ctx, const u8 *in_dat, size_t in_le + return SC_SUCCESS; + } + +- +-/* remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not +- * needed/implemented) */ ++/* Remove pkcs1 BT02 padding (adding BT02 padding is currently not ++ * needed/implemented) in constant-time. ++ * Original source: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/9890cc42daff5e2d0cad01ac4bf78c391f599a6e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c#L171 */ + int +-sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *out, size_t *out_len) ++sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int n, const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len, u8 *out, unsigned int *out_len) + { +- unsigned int n = 0; +- ++ unsigned int i = 0; ++ u8 *msg, *msg_orig = NULL; ++ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask; ++ unsigned int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, len = 0; + LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx); +- if (data == NULL || len < 3) ++ ++ if (data == NULL || data_len <= 0 || data_len > n || n < SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE) + LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); + +- /* skip leading zero byte */ +- if (*data == 0) { +- data++; +- len--; ++ msg = msg_orig = calloc(n, sizeof(u8)); ++ if (msg == NULL) ++ LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We can not check length of input data straight away and still we need to read ++ * from input even when the input is not as long as needed to keep the time constant. ++ * If data has wrong size, it is padded by zeroes from left and the following checks ++ * do not pass. ++ */ ++ len = data_len; ++ for (data += len, msg += n, i = 0; i < n; i++) { ++ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(len); ++ len -= 1 & mask; ++ data -= 1 & mask; ++ *--msg = *data & mask; ++ } ++ // check first byte to be 0x00 ++ good = constant_time_is_zero(msg[0]); ++ // check second byte to be 0x02 ++ good &= constant_time_eq(msg[1], 2); ++ ++ // find zero byte after random data in padding ++ found_zero_byte = 0; ++ for (i = 2; i < n; i++) { ++ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(msg[i]); ++ zero_index = constant_time_select(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); ++ found_zero_byte |= equals0; + } +- if (data[0] != 0x02) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); +- /* skip over padding bytes */ +- for (n = 1; n < len && data[n]; n++) +- ; +- /* Must be at least 8 pad bytes */ +- if (n >= len || n < 9) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); +- n++; +- if (out == NULL) +- /* just check the padding */ +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS); + +- /* Now move decrypted contents to head of buffer */ +- if (*out_len < len - n) +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL); +- *out_len = len - n; +- memmove(out, data + n, *out_len); ++ // zero_index stands for index of last found zero ++ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8); ++ ++ // start of the actual message in data ++ msg_index = zero_index + 1; ++ ++ // length of message ++ mlen = data_len - msg_index; ++ ++ // check that message fits into out buffer ++ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_len, mlen); ++ ++ // move the result in-place by |num|-SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left. ++ *out_len = constant_time_select(constant_time_lt(n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len), ++ n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, *out_len); ++ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) { ++ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (n - SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE - mlen), 0); ++ for (i = SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE; i < n - msg_index; i++) ++ msg[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[i + msg_index], msg[i]); ++ } ++ // move message into out buffer, if good ++ for (i = 0; i < *out_len; i++) { ++ unsigned int msg_index; ++ // when out is longer than message in data, use some bogus index in msg ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); ++ msg_index = constant_time_select(mask, i + SC_PKCS1_PADDING_MIN_SIZE, 0); // to now overflow msg buffer ++ out[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, msg[msg_index], out[i]); ++ } + +- sc_log(ctx, "stripped output(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", len - n, +- sc_dump_hex(out, len - n)); +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, len - n); ++ free(msg_orig); ++ return constant_time_select(good, mlen, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + } + + /* add/remove DigestInfo prefix */ +diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +index b86cb77c3..cea46798a 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c ++++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +@@ -308,8 +308,9 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, + + /* Strip any padding */ + if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) { +- size_t s = r; +- r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(ctx, out, s, out, &s); ++ int s = r; ++ int key_size = alg_info->key_length; ++ r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(ctx, key_size / 8, out, s, out, &s); + LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid PKCS#1 padding"); + } + +diff --git a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +index 0c089feab..e4d693a09 100644 +--- a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c ++++ b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +@@ -4582,9 +4582,9 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + "sc_pkcs15_decipher: DECRYPT-INFO dwVersion=%lu\n", + (unsigned long)pInfo->dwVersion); + if (pInfo->dwPaddingType == CARD_PADDING_PKCS1) { +- size_t temp = pInfo->cbData; ++ unsigned int temp = pInfo->cbData; + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher: stripping PKCS1 padding\n"); +- r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding(vs->ctx, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); ++ r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(vs->ctx, prkey_info->modulus_length / 8, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); + pInfo->cbData = (DWORD) temp; + if (r < 0) { + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "Cannot strip PKCS1 padding: %i\n", r); +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f3ca502ee --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +From c5ffd28572765a957ecadc8593c0bf0a596f535f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 14:31:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 02/10] Add unit tests for PKCS#1 v1.5 de-padding + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am | 5 +- + src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak | 5 +- + src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c + +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am +index 03019c324..4ef1c7206 100644 +--- a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.am +@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ include $(top_srcdir)/aminclude_static.am + clean-local: code-coverage-clean + distclean-local: code-coverage-dist-clean + +-noinst_PROGRAMS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir +-TESTS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir ++noinst_PROGRAMS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir strip_pkcs1_2_padding ++TESTS = asn1 simpletlv cachedir strip_pkcs1_2_padding + + noinst_HEADERS = torture.h + +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ LDADD = $(top_builddir)/src/libopensc/libopensc.la \ + asn1_SOURCES = asn1.c + simpletlv_SOURCES = simpletlv.c + cachedir_SOURCES = cachedir.c ++strip_pkcs1_2_padding = strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c + + if ENABLE_ZLIB + noinst_PROGRAMS += compression +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak +index 41762fdbf..a04086a67 100644 +--- a/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/Makefile.mak +@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ + TOPDIR = ..\..\.. + +-TARGETS = asn1 compression ++TARGETS = asn1 compression strip_pkcs1_2_padding + + OBJECTS = asn1.obj \ +- compression.obj ++ compression.obj \ ++ strip_pkcs1_2_padding.obj \ + $(TOPDIR)\win32\versioninfo.res + + all: $(TARGETS) +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..f9561b936 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ ++#include "common/compat_strlcpy.c" ++#include "libopensc/log.c" ++#include "libopensc/padding.c" ++#include "torture.h" ++#include ++ ++static void ++torture_long_output_buffer(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 3; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 3); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_output_buffer(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 1; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_message_correct_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 14; ++ unsigned int in_len = 14; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 3; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 3); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_first_zero(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_two(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_short_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_second_zero(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 13; ++ unsigned int in_len = 13; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 'm', 's', 'g'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 10; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_missing_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 20; ++ unsigned int in_len = 11; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 11; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_one_byte_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 12; ++ unsigned int in_len = 12; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, ++ 0x00, ++ 'm'}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 1; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m'}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 1); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_longer_padding(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 26; ++ unsigned int in_len = 26; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x0e, 0x38, 0x97, 0x18, 0x16, 0x57, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x78, 0x13, 0x20, 0xca, 0x11, ++ 0x00, ++ 0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 8; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char result_msg[] = {0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 8); ++ assert_memory_equal(out, result_msg, r); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++static void ++torture_empty_message(void **state) ++{ ++ unsigned int n = 18; ++ unsigned int in_len = 18; ++ unsigned char in[] = {0x00, 0x02, ++ 0x0e, 0x38, 0x97, 0x18, 0x16, 0x57, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x78, 0x13, 0x20, 0xca, 0x11, ++ 0x00}; ++ unsigned int out_len = 8; ++ unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); ++ assert_int_equal(r, 0); ++ free(out); ++} ++ ++int ++main(void) ++{ ++ const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = { ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_long_output_buffer), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_output_buffer), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_message_correct_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_first_zero), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_two), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_short_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_second_zero), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_missing_message), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_one_byte_message), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_longer_padding), ++ cmocka_unit_test(torture_empty_message)}; ++ return cmocka_run_group_tests(tests, NULL, NULL); ++} +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52a73064dc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 7266f151bb5896b9213d4cf0a298859a53cfb750 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 10:38:12 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 03/10] pkcs15-sec: Remove logging after PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding + +To prevent Marvin attack on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding +when logging the return value, signaling the padding error. + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +index cea46798a..b04856b4d 100644 +--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c ++++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c +@@ -308,13 +308,13 @@ int sc_pkcs15_decipher(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, + + /* Strip any padding */ + if (pad_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) { +- int s = r; +- int key_size = alg_info->key_length; ++ unsigned int s = r; ++ unsigned int key_size = (unsigned int)alg_info->key_length; + r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(ctx, key_size / 8, out, s, out, &s); +- LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Invalid PKCS#1 padding"); ++ /* for keeping PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time, do not log error here */ + } + +- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r); ++ return r; + } + + /* derive one key from another. RSA can use decipher, so this is for only ECDH +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..459e1d2a61 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 663dcbae0d92a05eba28ca56b80346b2fbe5a6d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 15:49:15 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 04/10] framework-pkcs15.c: Handle PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding + constant-time + +In order to not disclose time side-channel when the depadding +fails, do the same operations as for case when depadding ends +with success. + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +index 4fc8f13ab..8376057ea 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "config.h" + #include + #include +@@ -4341,7 +4342,8 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj, + struct pkcs15_fw_data *fw_data = NULL; + struct pkcs15_prkey_object *prkey; + unsigned char decrypted[512]; /* FIXME: Will not work for keys above 4096 bits */ +- int buff_too_small, rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0; ++ int rv, flags = 0, prkey_has_path = 0; ++ CK_ULONG mask, good, rv_pkcs11; + + sc_log(context, "Initiating decryption."); + +@@ -4415,27 +4417,53 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj, + rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags, + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted)); + +- if (rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path) ++ /* skip for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding prevent side channel attack */ ++ if (!(flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1) && ++ rv < 0 && !sc_pkcs11_conf.lock_login && !prkey_has_path) + if (reselect_app_df(fw_data->p15_card) == SC_SUCCESS) + rv = sc_pkcs15_decipher(fw_data->p15_card, prkey->prv_p15obj, flags, + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, decrypted, sizeof(decrypted)); + + sc_unlock(p11card->card); + +- sc_log(context, "Decryption complete. Result %d.", rv); ++ sc_log(context, "Decryption complete."); + +- if (rv < 0) +- return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt"); ++ /* Handle following code in constant-time ++ * to prevent Marvin attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. */ + +- buff_too_small = (*pulDataLen < (CK_ULONG)rv); +- *pulDataLen = rv; +- if (pData == NULL_PTR) +- return CKR_OK; +- if (buff_too_small) +- return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +- memcpy(pData, decrypted, *pulDataLen); ++ /* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way, ++ * other error can be returned straight away */ ++ if ((~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), rv))) ++ return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt"); + +- return CKR_OK; ++ /* check rv for padding error */ ++ good = ~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ rv_pkcs11 = sc_to_cryptoki_error(SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING, "C_Decrypt"); ++ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, rv_pkcs11); ++ ++ if (pData == NULL_PTR) { ++ /* set length only if no error */ ++ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen); ++ /* return error only if original rv < 0 */ ++ return rv_pkcs11; ++ } ++ ++ /* check whether *pulDataLen < rv and set return value for small output buffer */ ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(*pulDataLen, rv); ++ rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(mask, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, rv_pkcs11); ++ good &= ~mask; ++ ++ /* move everything from decrypted into out buffer constant-time, if rv is ok */ ++ for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < *pulDataLen; i++) { /* iterate over whole pData to not disclose real depadded length */ ++ CK_ULONG msg_index; ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(i, sizeof(decrypted)); /* i should be in the bounds of decrypted */ ++ mask &= constant_time_lt_s(i, constant_time_select_s(good, rv, 0)); /* check that is in bounds of depadded message */ ++ msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, i, 0); ++ pData[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, decrypted[msg_index], pData[i]); ++ } ++ *pulDataLen = constant_time_select_s(good, rv, *pulDataLen); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ return rv_pkcs11; + } + + +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a52b964306 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From f7fc30b02090d657b9ba64cbb5168cb5a94592ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 14:59:22 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 05/10] mechanism: Handle PKCS#1 v1.5 depadding constant-time + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/pkcs11/mechanism.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c +index c5959b36b..b3fce1714 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/mechanism.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "sc-pkcs11.h" + + /* Also used for verification data */ +@@ -844,7 +845,9 @@ sc_pkcs11_decr(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, + rv = op->type->decrypt(op, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, + pData, pulDataLen); + +- if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && pData != NULL) ++ /* terminate session for any return value except CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ++ * perform check in time side-channel free way to prevent Marvin attack */ ++ if (!constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) && pData != NULL) + session_stop_operation(session, SC_PKCS11_OPERATION_DECRYPT); + + return rv; +@@ -1084,14 +1087,22 @@ sc_pkcs11_decrypt(sc_pkcs11_operation_t *operation, + { + struct signature_data *data; + struct sc_pkcs11_object *key; ++ CK_RV rv; + + data = (struct signature_data*) operation->priv_data; + + key = data->key; +- return key->ops->decrypt(operation->session, ++ rv = key->ops->decrypt(operation->session, + key, &operation->mechanism, + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, + pData, pulDataLen); ++ ++ /* Skip DecryptFinalize for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding to prevent time side-channel leakage */ ++ if (((CK_MECHANISM_PTR)&operation->mechanism)->mechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS) ++ return rv; ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ return rv; + } + + static CK_RV +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b9c1f8ce3e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From 224a5a9bb32a8eb575dc30f18004c069c62fc8b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 15:02:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 06/10] minidriver: Make CardRSADecrypt constant-time + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/minidriver/minidriver.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +index e4d693a09..37e576ba2 100644 +--- a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c ++++ b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ + #include "cardmod.h" + + #include "common/compat_strlcpy.h" ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "libopensc/asn1.h" + #include "libopensc/cardctl.h" + #include "libopensc/opensc.h" +@@ -4463,13 +4464,15 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + + { + DWORD dwret; +- int r, opt_crypt_flags = 0; ++ int r, opt_crypt_flags = 0, good = 0; + unsigned ui; + VENDOR_SPECIFIC *vs; + struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info *prkey_info; + BYTE *pbuf = NULL, *pbuf2 = NULL; + struct sc_pkcs15_object *pkey = NULL; + struct sc_algorithm_info *alg_info = NULL; ++ unsigned int wrong_padding = 0; ++ unsigned int pbufLen = 0; + + MD_FUNC_CALLED(pCardData, 1); + +@@ -4570,10 +4573,11 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + goto err; + } + ++ pbufLen = pInfo->cbData; + if (alg_info->flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_RAW) { + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher: using RSA-RAW mechanism\n"); + r = sc_pkcs15_decipher(vs->p15card, pkey, opt_crypt_flags, pbuf, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData); +- logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher returned %d\n", r); ++ /* do not log return value to not leak it */ + + if (r > 0) { + /* Need to handle padding */ +@@ -4586,13 +4590,9 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher: stripping PKCS1 padding\n"); + r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(vs->ctx, prkey_info->modulus_length / 8, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); + pInfo->cbData = (DWORD) temp; +- if (r < 0) { +- logprintf(pCardData, 2, "Cannot strip PKCS1 padding: %i\n", r); +- pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf); +- pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf2); +- dwret = SCARD_F_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- goto err; +- } ++ wrong_padding = constant_time_eq_s(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ /* continue without returning error to not leak that padding is wrong ++ to prevent time side-channel leak for Marvin attack*/ + } + else if (pInfo->dwPaddingType == CARD_PADDING_OAEP) { + /* TODO: Handle OAEP padding if present - can call PFN_CSP_UNPAD_DATA */ +@@ -4640,28 +4640,38 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + goto err; + } + +- if ( r < 0) { ++ good = constant_time_eq_s(r, 0); ++ /* if no error or padding error, do not return here to prevent Marvin attack */ ++ if (!(good | wrong_padding) && r < 0) { + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher error(%i): %s\n", r, sc_strerror(r)); + pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf); + pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf2); + dwret = md_translate_OpenSC_to_Windows_error(r, SCARD_E_INVALID_VALUE); + goto err; + } ++ dwret = constant_time_select_s(good, SCARD_S_SUCCESS, SCARD_F_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "decrypted data(%lu):\n", + (unsigned long)pInfo->cbData); + loghex(pCardData, 7, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData); + + /*inversion donnees */ +- for(ui = 0; ui < pInfo->cbData; ui++) +- pInfo->pbData[ui] = pbuf2[pInfo->cbData-ui-1]; ++ /* copy data in constant-time way to prevent leak */ ++ for (ui = 0; ui < pbufLen; ui++) { ++ unsigned int mask, msg_index, inv_ui; ++ mask = good & constant_time_lt_s(ui, pInfo->cbData); /* ui should be in the bounds of pbuf2 */ ++ inv_ui = pInfo->cbData - ui - 1; ++ msg_index = constant_time_select_s(mask, inv_ui, 0); ++ pInfo->pbData[ui] = constant_time_select_8(mask, pbuf2[msg_index], pInfo->pbData[ui]); ++ } + + pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf); + pCardData->pfnCspFree(pbuf2); + + err: + unlock(pCardData); +- MD_FUNC_RETURN(pCardData, 1, dwret); ++ /* do not log return value to not leak it */ ++ return dwret; + } + + +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ccd44833fa --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 65f81aa8cdb8fa7e3c54165c9c800e6dae5591c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 20:59:07 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/10] pkcs11-object: Remove return value logging + +To prevent Marvin attack on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding +when logging the return value, signaling the padding error. + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c | 3 ++- + src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h | 5 +++++ + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c +index c5cf78a2b..aae149b86 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/pkcs11-object.c +@@ -930,7 +930,8 @@ CK_RV C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + rv = reset_login_state(session->slot, rv); + } + +- sc_log(context, "C_Decrypt() = %s", lookup_enum ( RV_T, rv )); ++ /* do not log error code to prevent side channel attack */ ++ SC_LOG("C_Decrypt()"); + sc_pkcs11_unlock(); + return rv; + } +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h b/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h +index 3c6b92ba4..35c8d5eb3 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h ++++ b/src/pkcs11/sc-pkcs11.h +@@ -226,6 +226,11 @@ struct sc_pkcs11_slot { + }; + typedef struct sc_pkcs11_slot sc_pkcs11_slot_t; + ++#define SC_LOG(fmt) \ ++ do { \ ++ sc_log(context, (fmt)); \ ++ } while (0) ++ + /* Debug virtual slots. S is slot to be highlighted or NULL + * C is a comment format string and args It will be preceded by "VSS " */ + #define DEBUG_VSS(S, ...) do { sc_log(context,"VSS " __VA_ARGS__); _debug_virtual_slots(S); } while (0) +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d50337902d --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 60f1966c06ed5fbe9e9e1edeefa2d280f5341484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 21:00:23 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/10] misc: Compare return value constant-time + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2948] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/pkcs11/misc.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/misc.c b/src/pkcs11/misc.c +index c3f5bb4e1..c0fd07240 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/misc.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/misc.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include "common/constant-time.h" + #include "sc-pkcs11.h" + + #define DUMP_TEMPLATE_MAX 32 +@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ CK_RV reset_login_state(struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot, CK_RV rv) + slot->p11card->framework->logout(slot); + } + +- if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) { ++ if (constant_time_eq_s(rv, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)) { + slot->login_user = -1; + pop_all_login_states(slot); + } +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d65555bca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +From e5f77a60bf22d76f695e360cc5c13c5c9ea8ba0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 11:30:11 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 09/10] unittests: Do not use uninitialized memory + +Thanks Coverity CID 414676, 414677, 414678, +414679, 414680, 414681, 414682, 414683, 414684, +414685, 414686 + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c | 22 ++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +index f9561b936..990e94a38 100644 +--- a/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c ++++ b/src/tests/unittests/strip_pkcs1_2_padding.c +@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ torture_long_output_buffer(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 3; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, 3); +@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ torture_short_output_buffer(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 1; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ torture_short_message_correct_padding(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 3; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m', 's', 'g'}; + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, 3); +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ torture_missing_first_zero(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 10; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ torture_missing_two(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 10; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ torture_short_padding(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 10; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ torture_missing_second_zero(void **state) + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 'm', 's', 'g'}; + unsigned int out_len = 10; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ torture_missing_message(void **state) + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x00}; + unsigned int out_len = 11; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + free(out); +@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ torture_one_byte_message(void **state) + 0x00, + 'm'}; + unsigned int out_len = 1; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + unsigned char result_msg[] = {'m'}; + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, 1); +@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ torture_longer_padding(void **state) + 0x00, + 0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; + unsigned int out_len = 8; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + unsigned char result_msg[] = {0x9d, 0x98, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x11, 0x0a}; + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, 8); +@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ torture_empty_message(void **state) + 0x0e, 0x38, 0x97, 0x18, 0x16, 0x57, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x78, 0x13, 0x20, 0xca, 0x11, + 0x00}; + unsigned int out_len = 8; +- unsigned char *out = malloc(out_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); ++ unsigned char *out = calloc(out_len, sizeof(unsigned char)); + int r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(NULL, n, in, in_len, out, &out_len); + assert_int_equal(r, 0); + free(out); +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2585406b56 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/files/CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 0039fe386c996faffaa2cf2d728c176cc239468b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Veronika=20Hanul=C3=ADkov=C3=A1?= +Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 13:33:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Fix constant-time comparison of negative values + +Thanks Coverity CID 414687 + +CVE: CVE-2023-5992 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/3016] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng +--- + src/common/constant-time.h | 6 ++++++ + src/minidriver/minidriver.c | 4 ++-- + src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c | 4 ++-- + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/constant-time.h b/src/common/constant-time.h +index 40c3e500c..3f4446d4d 100644 +--- a/src/common/constant-time.h ++++ b/src/common/constant-time.h +@@ -125,4 +125,10 @@ constant_time_eq_s(size_t a, size_t b) + return constant_time_is_zero_s(a ^ b); + } + ++static constant_inline unsigned int ++constant_time_eq_i(int a, int b) ++{ ++ return constant_time_eq((unsigned int)a, (unsigned int)b); ++} ++ + #endif /* CONSTANT_TIME_H */ +diff --git a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +index 37e576ba2..e2be9e53d 100644 +--- a/src/minidriver/minidriver.c ++++ b/src/minidriver/minidriver.c +@@ -4590,7 +4590,7 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher: stripping PKCS1 padding\n"); + r = sc_pkcs1_strip_02_padding_constant_time(vs->ctx, prkey_info->modulus_length / 8, pbuf2, pInfo->cbData, pbuf2, &temp); + pInfo->cbData = (DWORD) temp; +- wrong_padding = constant_time_eq_s(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ wrong_padding = constant_time_eq_i(r, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + /* continue without returning error to not leak that padding is wrong + to prevent time side-channel leak for Marvin attack*/ + } +@@ -4640,7 +4640,7 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardRSADecrypt(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, + goto err; + } + +- good = constant_time_eq_s(r, 0); ++ good = constant_time_eq_i(r, 0); + /* if no error or padding error, do not return here to prevent Marvin attack */ + if (!(good | wrong_padding) && r < 0) { + logprintf(pCardData, 2, "sc_pkcs15_decipher error(%i): %s\n", r, sc_strerror(r)); +diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +index 8376057ea..8b0a63b10 100644 +--- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c ++++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +@@ -4433,11 +4433,11 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj, + + /* only padding error must be handled in constant-time way, + * other error can be returned straight away */ +- if ((~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), rv))) ++ if ((~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING) & constant_time_lt_s(sizeof(decrypted), (size_t)rv))) + return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, "C_Decrypt"); + + /* check rv for padding error */ +- good = ~constant_time_eq_s(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); ++ good = ~constant_time_eq_i(rv, SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING); + rv_pkcs11 = sc_to_cryptoki_error(SC_ERROR_WRONG_PADDING, "C_Decrypt"); + rv_pkcs11 = constant_time_select_s(good, CKR_OK, rv_pkcs11); + +-- +2.50.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.22.0.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.22.0.bb index 52e29a5d92..30a9ae5468 100644 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.22.0.bb +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.22.0.bb @@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2024-45620-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2024-45620-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-45620-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0004.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0005.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0006.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0007.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0008.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0009.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-5992-0010.patch \ " # CVE-2021-34193 is a duplicate CVE covering the 5 individual