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frr: fix multiple CVEs
CVE-2024-27913: ospf_te_parse_te in ospfd/ospf_te.c in FRRouting (FRR) through 9.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (ospfd daemon crash) via a malformed OSPF LSA packet, because of an attempted access to a missing attribute field. CVE-2024-34088: In FRRouting (FRR) through 9.1, it is possible for the get_edge() function in ospf_te.c in the OSPF daemon to return a NULL pointer. In cases where calling functions do not handle the returned NULL value, the OSPF daemon crashes, leading to denial of service. CVE-2024-31950: In FRRouting (FRR) through 9.1, there can be a buffer overflow and daemon crash in ospf_te_parse_ri for OSPF LSA packets during an attempt to read Segment Routing subTLVs (their size is not validated). CVE-2024-31951: In the Opaque LSA Extended Link parser in FRRouting (FRR) through 9.1, there can be a buffer overflow and daemon crash in ospf_te_parse_ext_link for OSPF LSA packets during an attempt to read Segment Routing Adjacency SID subTLVs (lengths are not validated). CVE-2024-31948: In FRRouting (FRR) through 9.1, an attacker using a malformed Prefix SID attribute in a BGP UPDATE packet can cause the bgpd daemon to crash. Reference: [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27913] [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34088] [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31951] [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31950] [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31948] Upstream patches: [a73e66d073] [8c177d69e3] [5557a289ac] [f69d1313b1] [babb23b748] [ba6a8f1a31] Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
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commit
84ebedfcf4
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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From d2dda70be42402e0d456e1ead4035e196253f77f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 10:40:34 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] ospfd: Solved crash in OSPF TE parsing
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Iggy Frankovic discovered an ospfd crash when perfomring fuzzing of OSPF LSA
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packets. The crash occurs in ospf_te_parse_te() function when attemping to
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create corresponding egde from TE Link parameters. If there is no local
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address, an edge is created but without any attributes. During parsing, the
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function try to access to this attribute fields which has not been created
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causing an ospfd crash.
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The patch simply check if the te parser has found a valid local address. If not
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found, we stop the parser which avoid the crash.
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-27913
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/a73e66d07329d721f26f3f336f7735de420b0183]
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Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
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---
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ospfd/ospf_te.c | 4 ++++
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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index 999bc49d9..5af006e54 100644
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--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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@@ -2276,6 +2276,10 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_te(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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}
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/* Get corresponding Edge from Link State Data Base */
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+ if (IPV4_NET0(attr.standard.local.s_addr) && !attr.standard.local_id) {
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+ ote_debug(" |- Found no TE Link local address/ID. Abort!");
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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edge = get_edge(ted, attr.adv, attr.standard.local);
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old = edge->attributes;
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--
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2.35.5
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130
meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2024-31948.patch
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130
meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2024-31948.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
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From 2bbcfeb311533ddcebb0d25a9acb4675324ab03f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 18:42:56 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] bgpd: Fix error handling when receiving BGP Prefix SID
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attribute
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Without this patch, we always set the BGP Prefix SID attribute flag without
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checking if it's malformed or not. RFC8669 says that this attribute MUST be discarded.
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Also, this fixes the bgpd crash when a malformed Prefix SID attribute is received,
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with malformed transitive flags and/or TLVs.
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Reported-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com>
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Signed-off-by: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
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CVE: CVE-2024-31948
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/ba6a8f1a31e1a88df2de69ea46068e8bd9b97138]
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Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
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---
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bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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index ef45d5c46..236def2da 100644
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--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ bgp_attr_malformed(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args, uint8_t subcode,
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case BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR:
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case BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR:
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case BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
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+ case BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID:
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return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
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/* Core attributes, particularly ones which may influence route
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@@ -2892,8 +2893,6 @@ bgp_attr_parse_ret_t bgp_attr_prefix_sid(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
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struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
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bgp_attr_parse_ret_t ret;
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- attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID);
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-
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uint8_t type;
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uint16_t length;
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size_t headersz = sizeof(type) + sizeof(length);
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@@ -2943,6 +2942,8 @@ bgp_attr_parse_ret_t bgp_attr_prefix_sid(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
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}
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}
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+ SET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID));
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+
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return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
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}
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--
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2.35.5
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From 752612019f22277c387c5711305891d0b713e6c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 19:08:38 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] bgpd: Prevent from one more CVE triggering this place
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If we receive an attribute that is handled by bgp_attr_malformed(), use
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treat-as-withdraw behavior for unknown (or missing to add - if new) attributes.
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Signed-off-by: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
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CVE: CVE-2024-31948
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/babb23b74855e23c987a63f8256d24e28c044d07]
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Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
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---
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bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
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1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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index 236def2da..2c4fc70c4 100644
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--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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@@ -1285,6 +1285,15 @@ bgp_attr_malformed(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args, uint8_t subcode,
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(args->startp - STREAM_DATA(BGP_INPUT(peer)))
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+ args->total);
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+ /* Partial optional attributes that are malformed should not cause
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+ * the whole session to be reset. Instead treat it as a withdrawal
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+ * of the routes, if possible.
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+ */
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+ if (CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS) &&
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+ CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL) &&
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+ CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_PARTIAL))
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+ return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW;
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+
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switch (args->type) {
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/* where an attribute is relatively inconsequential, e.g. it does not
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* affect route selection, and can be safely ignored, then any such
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@@ -1318,19 +1327,21 @@ bgp_attr_malformed(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args, uint8_t subcode,
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bgp_notify_send_with_data(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR, subcode,
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notify_datap, length);
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return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
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+ default:
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+ /* Unknown attributes, that are handled by this function
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+ * should be treated as withdraw, to prevent one more CVE
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+ * from being introduced.
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+ * RFC 7606 says:
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+ * The "treat-as-withdraw" approach is generally preferred
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+ * and the "session reset" approach is discouraged.
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+ */
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+ flog_err(EC_BGP_ATTR_FLAG,
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+ "%s(%u) attribute received, while it is not known how to handle it, treating as withdraw",
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+ lookup_msg(attr_str, args->type, NULL), args->type);
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+ break;
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}
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- /* Partial optional attributes that are malformed should not cause
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- * the whole session to be reset. Instead treat it as a withdrawal
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- * of the routes, if possible.
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- */
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- if (CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS)
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- && CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL)
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- && CHECK_FLAG(flags, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_PARTIAL))
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- return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW;
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-
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- /* default to reset */
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- return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR_NOTIFYPLS;
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+ return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW;
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}
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/* Find out what is wrong with the path attribute flag bits and log the error.
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--
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2.35.5
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
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From fc1c932ba7384d69d76b3afe05eb3940ceeb6114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 16:28:23 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] ospfd: Solved crash in RI parsing with OSPF TE
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Iggy Frankovic discovered another ospfd crash when performing fuzzing of OSPF
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LSA packets. The crash occurs in ospf_te_parse_ri() function when attemping to
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read Segment Routing subTLVs. The original code doesn't check if the size of
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the SR subTLVs have the correct length. In presence of erronous LSA, this will
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cause a buffer overflow and ospfd crash.
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This patch introduces new verification of the subTLVs size for Router
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Information TLV.
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Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com>
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-31950
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/f69d1313b19047d3d83fc2b36a518355b861dfc4]
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Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
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---
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ospfd/ospf_te.c | 9 +++++++++
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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index 4e420edb3..8247c44a3 100644
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--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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@@ -2492,6 +2492,9 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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switch (ntohs(tlvh->type)) {
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case RI_SR_TLV_SR_ALGORITHM:
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+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) < 1 ||
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+ TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) > ALGORITHM_COUNT)
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+ break;
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algo = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sr_algorithm *)tlvh;
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for (int i = 0; i < ntohs(algo->header.length); i++) {
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@@ -2516,6 +2519,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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break;
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case RI_SR_TLV_SRGB_LABEL_RANGE:
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+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != RI_SR_TLV_LABEL_RANGE_SIZE)
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+ break;
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range = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sid_label_range *)tlvh;
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size = GET_RANGE_SIZE(ntohl(range->size));
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lower = GET_LABEL(ntohl(range->lower.value));
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@@ -2533,6 +2538,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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break;
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case RI_SR_TLV_SRLB_LABEL_RANGE:
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+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != RI_SR_TLV_LABEL_RANGE_SIZE)
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+ break;
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range = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sid_label_range *)tlvh;
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size = GET_RANGE_SIZE(ntohl(range->size));
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lower = GET_LABEL(ntohl(range->lower.value));
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@@ -2550,6 +2557,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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break;
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case RI_SR_TLV_NODE_MSD:
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+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) < RI_SR_TLV_NODE_MSD_SIZE)
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+ break;
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msd = (struct ri_sr_tlv_node_msd *)tlvh;
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if ((CHECK_FLAG(node->flags, LS_NODE_MSD))
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&& (node->msd == msd->value))
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--
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2.35.5
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111
meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2024-31951.patch
Normal file
111
meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2024-31951.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
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From 8dd8c6343b5aa930b7844a0e481267f3e805d906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 12:57:11 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] ospfd: Correct Opaque LSA Extended parser
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Iggy Frankovic discovered another ospfd crash when performing fuzzing of OSPF
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LSA packets. The crash occurs in ospf_te_parse_ext_link() function when
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attemping to read Segment Routing Adjacency SID subTLVs. The original code
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doesn't check if the size of the Extended Link TLVs and subTLVs have the correct
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length. In presence of erronous LSA, this will cause a buffer overflow and ospfd
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crashes.
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This patch introduces new verification of the subTLVs size for Extended Link
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TLVs and subTLVs. Similar check has been also introduced for the Extended
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Prefix TLV.
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Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com>
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-31951
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/5557a289acdaeec8cc63ffc97b5c2abf6dee7b3a]
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Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
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---
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ospfd/ospf_te.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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index 8247c44a3..1404506e5 100644
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--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
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@@ -2656,6 +2656,7 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_pref(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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struct ext_tlv_prefix *ext;
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struct ext_subtlv_prefix_sid *pref_sid;
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uint32_t label;
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+ uint16_t len, size;
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/* Get corresponding Subnet from Link State Data Base */
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ext = (struct ext_tlv_prefix *)TLV_HDR_TOP(lsa->data);
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@@ -2677,6 +2678,18 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_pref(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Prefix LSA %pI4 for subnet %pFX",
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&lsa->data->id, &pref);
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+ /*
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+ * Check Extended Prefix TLV size against LSA size
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+ * as only one TLV is allowed per LSA
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+ */
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+ len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header);
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+ size = lsa->size - (OSPF_LSA_HEADER_SIZE + TLV_HDR_SIZE);
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+ if (len != size || len <= 0) {
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+ ote_debug(" |- Wrong TLV size: %u instead of %u",
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+ (uint32_t)len, (uint32_t)size);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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/* Initialize TLV browsing */
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ls_pref = subnet->ls_pref;
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pref_sid = (struct ext_subtlv_prefix_sid *)((char *)(ext) + TLV_HDR_SIZE
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@@ -2791,8 +2804,20 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Link LSA %pI4 for edge %pI4",
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&lsa->data->id, &edge->attributes->standard.local);
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- /* Initialize TLV browsing */
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- len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header) - EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE;
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+ /*
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+ * Check Extended Link TLV size against LSA size
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+ * as only one TLV is allowed per LSA
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+ */
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+ len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header);
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+ i = lsa->size - (OSPF_LSA_HEADER_SIZE + TLV_HDR_SIZE);
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+ if (len != i || len <= 0) {
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+ ote_debug(" |- Wrong TLV size: %u instead of %u",
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+ (uint32_t)len, (uint32_t)i);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Initialize subTLVs browsing */
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+ len -= EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE;
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tlvh = (struct tlv_header *)((char *)(ext) + TLV_HDR_SIZE
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+ EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE);
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for (; sum < len; tlvh = TLV_HDR_NEXT(tlvh)) {
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@@ -2802,6 +2827,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
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switch (ntohs(tlvh->type)) {
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case EXT_SUBTLV_ADJ_SID:
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+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_ADJ_SID_SIZE)
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+ break;
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||||
adj = (struct ext_subtlv_adj_sid *)tlvh;
|
||||
label = CHECK_FLAG(adj->flags,
|
||||
EXT_SUBTLV_LINK_ADJ_SID_VFLG)
|
||||
@@ -2828,6 +2855,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case EXT_SUBTLV_LAN_ADJ_SID:
|
||||
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_LAN_ADJ_SID_SIZE)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
ladj = (struct ext_subtlv_lan_adj_sid *)tlvh;
|
||||
label = CHECK_FLAG(ladj->flags,
|
||||
EXT_SUBTLV_LINK_ADJ_SID_VFLG)
|
||||
@@ -2857,6 +2886,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case EXT_SUBTLV_RMT_ITF_ADDR:
|
||||
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_RMT_ITF_ADDR_SIZE)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
rmt = (struct ext_subtlv_rmt_itf_addr *)tlvh;
|
||||
if (CHECK_FLAG(atr->flags, LS_ATTR_NEIGH_ADDR)
|
||||
&& IPV4_ADDR_SAME(&atr->standard.remote,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.35.5
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
From 10ff8433557df40c6d7e4361cc468a1192185fdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 16:42:06 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ospfd: protect call to get_edge() in ospf_te.c
|
||||
|
||||
During fuzzing, Iggy Frankovic discovered that get_edge() function in ospf_te.c
|
||||
could return null pointer, in particular when the link_id or advertised router
|
||||
IP addresses are fuzzed. As the null pointer returned by get_edge() function is
|
||||
not handlei by calling functions, this could cause ospfd crash.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch introduces new verification of returned pointer by get_edge()
|
||||
function and stop the processing in case of null pointer. In addition, link ID
|
||||
and advertiser router ID are validated before calling ls_find_edge_by_key() to
|
||||
avoid the creation of a new edge with an invalid key.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-34088
|
||||
|
||||
Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
|
||||
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2024-34088
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/8c177d69e32b91b45bda5fc5da6511fa03dc11ca]
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
ospfd/ospf_te.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
|
||||
index 5af006e54..4e420edb3 100644
|
||||
--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
|
||||
+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
|
||||
@@ -1686,6 +1686,11 @@ static struct ls_edge *get_edge(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ls_node_id adv,
|
||||
struct ls_edge *edge;
|
||||
struct ls_attributes *attr;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Check that Link ID and Node ID are valid */
|
||||
+ if (IPV4_NET0(link_id.s_addr) || IPV4_NET0(adv.id.ip.addr.s_addr) ||
|
||||
+ adv.origin != OSPFv2)
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Search Edge that corresponds to the Link ID */
|
||||
key = ((uint64_t)ntohl(link_id.s_addr)) & 0xffffffff;
|
||||
edge = ls_find_edge_by_key(ted, key);
|
||||
@@ -1758,6 +1763,10 @@ static void ospf_te_update_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ls_vertex *vertex,
|
||||
|
||||
/* Get Corresponding Edge from Link State Data Base */
|
||||
edge = get_edge(ted, vertex->node->adv, link_data);
|
||||
+ if (!edge) {
|
||||
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Link Data. Abort!");
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
attr = edge->attributes;
|
||||
|
||||
/* re-attached edge to vertex if needed */
|
||||
@@ -2276,11 +2285,11 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_te(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Get corresponding Edge from Link State Data Base */
|
||||
- if (IPV4_NET0(attr.standard.local.s_addr) && !attr.standard.local_id) {
|
||||
- ote_debug(" |- Found no TE Link local address/ID. Abort!");
|
||||
+ edge = get_edge(ted, attr.adv, attr.standard.local);
|
||||
+ if (!edge) {
|
||||
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Link local add./ID. Abort!");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- edge = get_edge(ted, attr.adv, attr.standard.local);
|
||||
old = edge->attributes;
|
||||
|
||||
ote_debug(" |- Process Traffic Engineering LSA %pI4 for Edge %pI4",
|
||||
@@ -2764,6 +2773,10 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted, struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
|
||||
lnid.id.ip.area_id = lsa->area->area_id;
|
||||
ext = (struct ext_tlv_link *)TLV_HDR_TOP(lsa->data);
|
||||
edge = get_edge(ted, lnid, ext->link_data);
|
||||
+ if (!edge) {
|
||||
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Extended Link Data. Abort!");
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
atr = edge->attributes;
|
||||
|
||||
ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Link LSA %pI4 for edge %pI4",
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.35.5
|
||||
|
||||
@ -28,7 +28,12 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/FRRouting/frr.git;protocol=https;branch=stable/8.2 \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-47234.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-47235.patch \
|
||||
file://frr.pam \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-44070.patch\
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-44070.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-27913.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-34088.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-31950.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-31951.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-31948.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRCREV = "79188bf710e92acf42fb5b9b0a2e9593a5ee9b05"
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user