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gpsd: patch CVE-2025-67269

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Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67269

Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
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Ankur Tyagi 2026-01-17 22:45:31 +13:00 committed by Anuj Mittal
parent 85f404194e
commit b3da92e178
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GPG Key ID: 4340AEFE69F5085C
2 changed files with 151 additions and 0 deletions
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150
meta-oe/recipes-navigation/gpsd/gpsd/CVE-2025-67269.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
From 0a0448c7d5dabe0eef940108c6e85de16e45e757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gary E. Miller" <gem@rellim.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 19:04:03 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] gpsd/packet.c: Fix integer underflow is malicious Navcom
packet
Causes DoS. Fix issue 358
CVE: CVE-2025-67269
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gpsd/gpsd/-/commit/ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7]
Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
---
gpsd/packet.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gpsd/packet.c b/gpsd/packet.c
index 8e14a17ff..51c51ced9 100644
--- a/gpsd/packet.c
+++ b/gpsd/packet.c
@@ -947,18 +947,22 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
#endif // SIRF_ENABLE || SKYTRAQ_ENABLE
#ifdef SIRF_ENABLE
case SIRF_LEADER_2:
- // first part of length
- lexer->length = (size_t) (c << 8);
+ // first part of length, MSB
+ lexer->length = (c & 0x7f) << 8;
+ if (lexer->length > MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
+ return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
+ } // else
lexer->state = SIRF_LENGTH_1;
break;
case SIRF_LENGTH_1:
// second part of length
lexer->length += c + 2;
- if (lexer->length <= MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) {
- lexer->state = SIRF_PAYLOAD;
- } else {
+ if (lexer->length > MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
- }
+ } // else
+ lexer->state = SIRF_PAYLOAD;
break;
case SIRF_PAYLOAD:
if (0 == --lexer->length) {
@@ -1000,6 +1004,7 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
}
if (MAX_PACKET_LENGTH < lexer->length) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
}
lexer->state = SKY_PAYLOAD;
@@ -1182,14 +1187,29 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
}
break;
case NAVCOM_LEADER_3:
+ // command ID
lexer->state = NAVCOM_ID;
break;
case NAVCOM_ID:
- lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4;
+ /* Length LSB
+ * Navcom length includes command ID, length bytes. and checksum.
+ * So for more than just the payload length.
+ * Minimum 4 bytes */
+ if (4 > c) {
+ return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
+ }
+ lexer->length = c;
lexer->state = NAVCOM_LENGTH_1;
break;
case NAVCOM_LENGTH_1:
+ // Length USB. Navcom allows payload length up to 65,531
lexer->length += (c << 8);
+ // don't count ID, length and checksum in payload length
+ lexer->length -= 4;
+ if (MAX_PACKET_LENGTH < lexer->length) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
+ return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
+ } // else
lexer->state = NAVCOM_LENGTH_2;
break;
case NAVCOM_LENGTH_2:
@@ -1316,11 +1336,11 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
lexer->length += 2; // checksum
// 10 bytes is the length of the Zodiac header
// no idea what Zodiac max length really is
- if ((MAX_PACKET_LENGTH - 10) >= lexer->length) {
- lexer->state = ZODIAC_PAYLOAD;
- } else {
+ if ((MAX_PACKET_LENGTH - 10) < lexer->length) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
- }
+ } // else
+ lexer->state = ZODIAC_PAYLOAD;
break;
case ZODIAC_PAYLOAD:
if (0 == --lexer->length) {
@@ -1356,6 +1376,7 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
lexer->state = UBX_LENGTH_2;
} else {
// bad length
+ lexer->length = 0;
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
}
break;
@@ -1502,16 +1523,16 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
lexer->state = GEOSTAR_MESSAGE_ID_2;
break;
case GEOSTAR_MESSAGE_ID_2:
- lexer->length = (size_t)c * 4;
+ lexer->length = c * 4;
lexer->state = GEOSTAR_LENGTH_1;
break;
case GEOSTAR_LENGTH_1:
lexer->length += (c << 8) * 4;
- if (MAX_PACKET_LENGTH >= lexer->length) {
- lexer->state = GEOSTAR_LENGTH_2;
- } else {
+ if (MAX_PACKET_LENGTH < lexer->length) {
+ lexer->length = 0;
return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
- }
+ } // else
+ lexer->state = GEOSTAR_LENGTH_2;
break;
case GEOSTAR_LENGTH_2:
lexer->state = GEOSTAR_PAYLOAD;
@@ -1823,6 +1844,16 @@ static bool nextstate(struct gps_lexer_t *lexer, unsigned char c)
#endif // STASH_ENABLE
}
+ /* Catch length overflow. Should not happen.
+ * length is size_t, so underflow looks like overflow too. */
+ if (MAX_PACKET_LENGTH <= lexer->length) {
+ GPSD_LOG(LOG_WARN, &lexer->errout,
+ "Too long: %zu state %u %s c x%x\n",
+ lexer->length, lexer->state, state_table[lexer->state], c);
+ // exit(255);
+ lexer->length = 0;
+ return character_pushback(lexer, GROUND_STATE);
+ }
return true; // no pushback
}

1
meta-oe/recipes-navigation/gpsd/gpsd_3.24.bb
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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ PROVIDES = "virtual/gpsd"
SRC_URI = "${SAVANNAH_GNU_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://gpsd.init \
file://CVE-2025-67268.patch \
file://CVE-2025-67269.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "00ee13f615655284874a661be13553abe66128e6deb5cd648af9bc0cb345fe5c"