diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis-7.2.8/CVE-2025-32023.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis-7.2.8/CVE-2025-32023.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb7e81c0b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis-7.2.8/CVE-2025-32023.patch @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +From 50188747cbfe43528d2719399a2a3c9599169445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "debing.sun" +Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 18:25:06 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix out of bounds write in hyperloglog commands + (CVE-2025-32023) + +Co-authored-by: oranagra + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/50188747cbfe43528d2719399a2a3c9599169445] +CVE: CVE-2025-32023 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + src/hyperloglog.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + tests/unit/hyperloglog.tcl | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/hyperloglog.c b/src/hyperloglog.c +index 1a74f47..ca592a0 100644 +--- a/src/hyperloglog.c ++++ b/src/hyperloglog.c +@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ int hllSparseToDense(robj *o) { + struct hllhdr *hdr, *oldhdr = (struct hllhdr*)sparse; + int idx = 0, runlen, regval; + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t*)sparse, *end = p+sdslen(sparse); ++ int valid = 1; + + /* If the representation is already the right one return ASAP. */ + hdr = (struct hllhdr*) sparse; +@@ -606,16 +607,27 @@ int hllSparseToDense(robj *o) { + while(p < end) { + if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_ZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_ZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + idx += runlen; + p++; + } else if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_XZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_XZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + idx += runlen; + p += 2; + } else { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_LEN(p); + regval = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_VALUE(p); +- if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) break; /* Overflow. */ ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + while(runlen--) { + HLL_DENSE_SET_REGISTER(hdr->registers,idx,regval); + idx++; +@@ -626,7 +638,7 @@ int hllSparseToDense(robj *o) { + + /* If the sparse representation was valid, we expect to find idx + * set to HLL_REGISTERS. */ +- if (idx != HLL_REGISTERS) { ++ if (!valid || idx != HLL_REGISTERS) { + sdsfree(dense); + return C_ERR; + } +@@ -923,27 +935,40 @@ int hllSparseAdd(robj *o, unsigned char *ele, size_t elesize) { + void hllSparseRegHisto(uint8_t *sparse, int sparselen, int *invalid, int* reghisto) { + int idx = 0, runlen, regval; + uint8_t *end = sparse+sparselen, *p = sparse; ++ int valid = 1; + + while(p < end) { + if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_ZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_ZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + idx += runlen; + reghisto[0] += runlen; + p++; + } else if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_XZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_XZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + idx += runlen; + reghisto[0] += runlen; + p += 2; + } else { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_LEN(p); + regval = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_VALUE(p); ++ if ((runlen + idx) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + idx += runlen; + reghisto[regval] += runlen; + p++; + } + } +- if (idx != HLL_REGISTERS && invalid) *invalid = 1; ++ if ((!valid || idx != HLL_REGISTERS) && invalid) *invalid = 1; + } + + /* ========================= HyperLogLog Count ============================== +@@ -1091,22 +1116,34 @@ int hllMerge(uint8_t *max, robj *hll) { + } else { + uint8_t *p = hll->ptr, *end = p + sdslen(hll->ptr); + long runlen, regval; ++ int valid = 1; + + p += HLL_HDR_SIZE; + i = 0; + while(p < end) { + if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_ZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_ZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + i) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + i += runlen; + p++; + } else if (HLL_SPARSE_IS_XZERO(p)) { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_XZERO_LEN(p); ++ if ((runlen + i) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + i += runlen; + p += 2; + } else { + runlen = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_LEN(p); + regval = HLL_SPARSE_VAL_VALUE(p); +- if ((runlen + i) > HLL_REGISTERS) break; /* Overflow. */ ++ if ((runlen + i) > HLL_REGISTERS) { /* Overflow. */ ++ valid = 0; ++ break; ++ } + while(runlen--) { + if (regval > max[i]) max[i] = regval; + i++; +@@ -1114,7 +1151,7 @@ int hllMerge(uint8_t *max, robj *hll) { + p++; + } + } +- if (i != HLL_REGISTERS) return C_ERR; ++ if (!valid || i != HLL_REGISTERS) return C_ERR; + } + return C_OK; + } +diff --git a/tests/unit/hyperloglog.tcl b/tests/unit/hyperloglog.tcl +index ee43718..bc90eb2 100644 +--- a/tests/unit/hyperloglog.tcl ++++ b/tests/unit/hyperloglog.tcl +@@ -137,6 +137,57 @@ start_server {tags {"hll"}} { + set e + } {*WRONGTYPE*} + ++ test {Corrupted sparse HyperLogLogs doesn't cause overflow and out-of-bounds with XZERO opcode} { ++ r del hll ++ ++ # Create a sparse-encoded HyperLogLog header ++ set pl [string cat "HYLL" [binary format c12 {1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0}]] ++ ++ # Create an XZERO opcode with the maximum run length of 16384(2^14) ++ set runlen [expr 16384 - 1] ++ set chunk [binary format cc [expr {0b01000000 | ($runlen >> 8)}] [expr {$runlen & 0xff}]] ++ # Fill the HLL with more than 131072(2^17) XZERO opcodes to make the total ++ # run length exceed 4GB, will cause an integer overflow. ++ set repeat [expr 131072 + 1000] ++ for {set i 0} {$i < $repeat} {incr i} { ++ append pl $chunk ++ } ++ ++ # Create a VAL opcode with a value that will cause out-of-bounds. ++ append pl [binary format c 0b11111111] ++ r set hll $pl ++ ++ # This should not overflow and out-of-bounds. ++ assert_error {*INVALIDOBJ*} {r pfcount hll hll} ++ assert_error {*INVALIDOBJ*} {r pfdebug getreg hll} ++ r ping ++ } ++ ++ test {Corrupted sparse HyperLogLogs doesn't cause overflow and out-of-bounds with ZERO opcode} { ++ r del hll ++ ++ # Create a sparse-encoded HyperLogLog header ++ set pl [string cat "HYLL" [binary format c12 {1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0}]] ++ ++ # # Create an ZERO opcode with the maximum run length of 64(2^6) ++ set chunk [binary format c [expr {0b00000000 | 0x3f}]] ++ # Fill the HLL with more than 33554432(2^17) ZERO opcodes to make the total ++ # run length exceed 4GB, will cause an integer overflow. ++ set repeat [expr 33554432 + 1000] ++ for {set i 0} {$i < $repeat} {incr i} { ++ append pl $chunk ++ } ++ ++ # Create a VAL opcode with a value that will cause out-of-bounds. ++ append pl [binary format c 0b11111111] ++ r set hll $pl ++ ++ # This should not overflow and out-of-bounds. ++ assert_error {*INVALIDOBJ*} {r pfcount hll hll} ++ assert_error {*INVALIDOBJ*} {r pfdebug getreg hll} ++ r ping ++ } ++ + test {Corrupted dense HyperLogLogs are detected: Wrong length} { + r del hll + r pfadd hll a b c +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis_7.2.8.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis_7.2.8.bb index bf9de7a166..a1739b4f30 100644 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis_7.2.8.bb +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis_7.2.8.bb @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.redis.io/releases/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://0004-src-Do-not-reset-FINAL_LIBS.patch \ file://0005-Define-_GNU_SOURCE-to-get-PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER.patch \ file://0006-Define-correct-gregs-for-RISCV32.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-32023.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6be4fdfcdb2e5ac91454438246d00842d2671f792673390e742dfcaf1bf01574"