mirror of
git://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded
synced 2026-04-02 02:49:12 +00:00
krb5: fix CVE-2024-26458 and CVE-2024-26461
Upstream-Status: Backport from c5f9c81610
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Hitendra Prajapati
Armin Kuster
parent
52ecd66835
commit
f0b3330b9d
@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
|
||||
From c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 19:53:07 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix two unlikely memory leaks
|
||||
|
||||
In gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(), one of the bounds checks (which
|
||||
could probably never be triggered) leaks plain.data. Fix this leak
|
||||
and use current practices for cleanup throughout the function.
|
||||
|
||||
In xmt_rmtcallres() (unused within the tree and likely elsewhere),
|
||||
store port_ptr into crp->port_ptr as soon as it is allocated;
|
||||
otherwise it could leak if the subsequent xdr_u_int32() operation
|
||||
fails.
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d]
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2024-26458 CVE-2024-26461
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c | 56 +++++++++++++++-------------------
|
||||
src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c | 9 +++---
|
||||
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
|
||||
index 48fc508..606fa6d 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
|
||||
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
int conf_req_flag, int toktype)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t bufsize = 16;
|
||||
- unsigned char *outbuf = 0;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
|
||||
krb5_error_code err;
|
||||
int key_usage;
|
||||
unsigned char acceptor_flag;
|
||||
@@ -75,9 +75,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
size_t ec;
|
||||
unsigned short tok_id;
|
||||
- krb5_checksum sum;
|
||||
+ krb5_checksum sum = { 0 };
|
||||
krb5_key key;
|
||||
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
|
||||
+ krb5_data plain = empty_data();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ token->value = NULL;
|
||||
+ token->length = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
acceptor_flag = ctx->initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
|
||||
key_usage = (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
|
||||
@@ -107,14 +111,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
|
||||
- krb5_data plain;
|
||||
krb5_enc_data cipher;
|
||||
size_t ec_max;
|
||||
size_t encrypt_size;
|
||||
|
||||
/* 300: Adds some slop. */
|
||||
- if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length)
|
||||
- return ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length) {
|
||||
+ err = ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
ec_max = SIZE_MAX - message->length - 300;
|
||||
if (ec_max > 0xffff)
|
||||
ec_max = 0xffff;
|
||||
@@ -126,20 +131,20 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16 + ec);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
- return err;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Get size of ciphertext. */
|
||||
encrypt_size = krb5_encrypt_size(plain.length, key->keyblock.enctype);
|
||||
if (encrypt_size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
|
||||
err = ENOMEM;
|
||||
- goto error;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
bufsize = 16 + encrypt_size;
|
||||
/* Allocate space for header plus encrypted data. */
|
||||
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
|
||||
if (outbuf == NULL) {
|
||||
- free(plain.data);
|
||||
- return ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ err = ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* TOK_ID */
|
||||
@@ -165,11 +170,8 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
cipher.ciphertext.length = bufsize - 16;
|
||||
cipher.enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
|
||||
err = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, key_usage, 0, &plain, &cipher);
|
||||
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
|
||||
- free(plain.data);
|
||||
- plain.data = 0;
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
- goto error;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now that we know we're returning a valid token.... */
|
||||
ctx->seq_send++;
|
||||
@@ -182,7 +184,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
/* If the rotate fails, don't worry about it. */
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && !conf_req_flag) {
|
||||
- krb5_data plain;
|
||||
size_t cksumsize;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Here, message is the application-supplied data; message2 is
|
||||
@@ -194,21 +195,19 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
wrap_with_checksum:
|
||||
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
- return err;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
- goto error;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
assert(cksumsize <= 0xffff);
|
||||
|
||||
bufsize = 16 + message2->length + cksumsize;
|
||||
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
|
||||
if (outbuf == NULL) {
|
||||
- free(plain.data);
|
||||
- plain.data = 0;
|
||||
err = ENOMEM;
|
||||
- goto error;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* TOK_ID */
|
||||
@@ -240,23 +239,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
if (message2->length)
|
||||
memcpy(outbuf + 16, message2->value, message2->length);
|
||||
|
||||
- sum.contents = outbuf + 16 + message2->length;
|
||||
- sum.length = cksumsize;
|
||||
-
|
||||
err = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
|
||||
key_usage, &plain, &sum);
|
||||
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
|
||||
- free(plain.data);
|
||||
- plain.data = 0;
|
||||
if (err) {
|
||||
zap(outbuf,bufsize);
|
||||
- goto error;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sum.length != cksumsize)
|
||||
abort();
|
||||
memcpy(outbuf + 16 + message2->length, sum.contents, cksumsize);
|
||||
- krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
|
||||
- sum.contents = 0;
|
||||
/* Now that we know we're actually generating the token... */
|
||||
ctx->seq_send++;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -286,12 +277,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
|
||||
|
||||
token->value = outbuf;
|
||||
token->length = bufsize;
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
+ outbuf = NULL;
|
||||
+ err = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
-error:
|
||||
+cleanup:
|
||||
+ krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
|
||||
+ zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
|
||||
gssalloc_free(outbuf);
|
||||
- token->value = NULL;
|
||||
- token->length = 0;
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
|
||||
index 8c7e30c..0748af3 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
|
||||
@@ -160,11 +160,12 @@ xdr_rmtcallres(
|
||||
caddr_t port_ptr;
|
||||
|
||||
port_ptr = (caddr_t)(void *)crp->port_ptr;
|
||||
- if (xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
|
||||
- xdr_u_int32) && xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen)) {
|
||||
- crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
|
||||
+ if (!xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
|
||||
+ (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32))
|
||||
+ return (FALSE);
|
||||
+ crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
|
||||
+ if (xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen))
|
||||
return ((*(crp->xdr_results))(xdrs, crp->results_ptr));
|
||||
- }
|
||||
return (FALSE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}.tar.gz \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-36054.patch;striplevel=2 \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-37370_37371-pre1.patch;striplevel=2 \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-37370_37371.patch;striplevel=2 \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-26458_CVE-2024-26461.patch;striplevel=2 \
|
||||
"
|
||||
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "aa4337fffa3b61f22dbd0167f708818f"
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a4bba94df92f6d39a197a10687653e8bfbc9a2076e129f6eb92766974f86134"
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user