qemu: Backport fix for CVE-2023-2861

Updated 0012-fix-libcap-header-issue-on-some-distro.patch to resolve
patch fuzz caused by the CVE-2023-2861 patch

Upstream-Status: Backport
[a5804fcf7b
&
f6b0de53fb]

(From OE-Core rev: cede843cdd1d1a83b2d616086aa69a2b584f9442)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Vijay Anusuri 2024-01-16 07:35:36 +05:30 committed by Steve Sakoman
parent 7e3b27865d
commit 854aafaea4
4 changed files with 249 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2023-3180.patch \
file://CVE-2020-24165.patch \
file://CVE-2023-5088.patch \
file://9pfs-local-ignore-O_NOATIME-if-we-don-t-have-permiss.patch \
file://CVE-2023-2861.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"

View File

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
index 300c9765..2823db7d 100644
--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
#include <sys/fsuid.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
@@ -27,7 +26,11 @@
#include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
@@ -28,7 +27,11 @@
#include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
#include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
-
+/*
@ -84,3 +84,6 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
#define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
#ifndef XFS_SUPER_MAGIC
--
2.25.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 08:06:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: ignore O_NOATIME if we don't have permissions
QEMU's local 9pfs server passes through O_NOATIME from the client. If
the QEMU process doesn't have permissions to use O_NOATIME (namely, it
does not own the file nor have the CAP_FOWNER capability), the open will
fail. This causes issues when from the client's point of view, it
believes it has permissions to use O_NOATIME (e.g., a process running as
root in the virtual machine). Additionally, overlayfs on Linux opens
files on the lower layer using O_NOATIME, so in this case a 9pfs mount
can't be used as a lower layer for overlayfs (cf.
https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/dabfe1971951701da13863dbe6d8a1d172ad9650/vmtest/onoatimehack.c
and https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/54509).
Luckily, O_NOATIME is effectively a hint, and is often ignored by, e.g.,
network filesystems. open(2) notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective
on all filesystems. One example is NFS, where the server maintains the
access time." This means that we can honor it when possible but fall
back to ignoring it.
Acked-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Message-Id: <e9bee604e8df528584693a4ec474ded6295ce8ad.1587149256.git.osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b]
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index 79ed6b233e5..546f46dc7dc 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -37,9 +37,22 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
{
int fd, serrno, ret;
+again:
fd = openat(dirfd, name, flags | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK,
mode);
if (fd == -1) {
+ if (errno == EPERM && (flags & O_NOATIME)) {
+ /*
+ * The client passed O_NOATIME but we lack permissions to honor it.
+ * Rather than failing the open, fall back without O_NOATIME. This
+ * doesn't break the semantics on the client side, as the Linux
+ * open(2) man page notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective on
+ * all filesystems". In particular, NFS and other network
+ * filesystems ignore it entirely.
+ */
+ flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
+ goto again;
+ }
return -1;
}
--
GitLab

View File

@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
From f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 18:29:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when
client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does
make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side
in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to
open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively
on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape
from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host
side.
With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:
- Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough'
security model.
or
- Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as
root).
These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before,
however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.
Fixes: CVE-2023-2861
Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda]
CVE: CVE-2023-2861
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
index 6f132c5f..300c9765 100644
--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "qemu/xattr.h"
#include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
#include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
+#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
#include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
#define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
@@ -350,6 +351,28 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
}
}
+/*
+ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
+ * rejected.
+ *
+ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
+ */
+static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ return fd;
+ }
+
+ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return fd;
+}
+
/*
* send response in two parts
* 1) ProxyHeader
@@ -694,7 +717,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
if (ret < 0) {
goto unmarshal_err_out;
}
- ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
+ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -errno;
}
@@ -719,7 +742,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
if (ret < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
- ret = open(path.data, flags);
+ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -errno;
}
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index 546f46dc..79fdd2a3 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@
#ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
#define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+
#ifdef O_PATH
#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
#else
#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
#endif
+#define qemu_fstat fstat
+
static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
{
int serrno = errno;
@@ -26,6 +30,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
errno = serrno;
}
+/**
+ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
+ *
+ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
+ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
+ *
+ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
+ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
+ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
+ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
+ */
+static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
+{
+ struct stat stbuf;
+
+ if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
+ close_preserve_errno(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+ error_report_once(
+ "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
+ "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
+ );
+ close(fd);
+ errno = ENXIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
{
return openat(dirfd, name,
@@ -56,6 +92,10 @@ again:
return -1;
}
+ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
serrno = errno;
/* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
* do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
--
2.25.1